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In recent times, the incidence of single-parent families has increased rapidly with the 
principle cause being the rising divorce rate. The vast majority of these single-parent 
families are headed by women and a predominantly common factor in these 
households is the extent to which they are financially impoverished after divorce. This 
situation has given rise to the phenomenon known as the feminisation of poverty, 
where women are seen to make up the majority of the poor. This study examines the 
many varied factors contributing to this phenomenon and discusses some of the 
general solutions offered world-wide to address these poverty-stricken households. 
An assessment is then made of those legal solutions most appropriate for South 
Africa. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The family, in one form or another, is the recognised basic social unit of all societies 
and women are seen to be inseparable from it. Most functions assigned to the family 
are allocated to the women within it; women are usually the carers, the nurturers, the 
educators, the source of stability, and increasingly, they are the major cash 
contributors. 1 
There is no simple view of the family, nor can there be a universally applicable 
definition, for there is great diversity and divergence of family types. Furthermore, the 
family is a living, evolving institution, affected by socio-economic factors as well as by 
changes that shape the social environment in which it functions. Consequently, 
families are undergoing constant change, due to numerous factors, including the 
quest for equality between men and women, equality on the grounds of sexual 
orientation and the widening opportunities for women as well as shifts in values, 
particularly those supporting individualism.2 
New family types ~ave been seen to emerge. We have witnessed the support 
structure of the extended family giving way to that of the nuclear family3 , which has 
also recently been seen to diminish in importance, with one-parent families becoming 
increasingly prevalent.4 
There are various causes of one-parent families, an important source being births to 
childless mothers outside a marriage or consensual union. The major driving force, 
world-wide, behind the rapid increase in the incidence of one-parent families, has 
however been the rising divorce rate5 and the emphasis in this discussion will be on 
these post divorce households. 
10'Connell H Women and the Family at 10. 
21bid. 
3Described as consisting of a couple and their dependent children. 
4Between 1971 and 1986 the number of one-parent families in Great Britain increased by nearly 80%. 
See Ermisch JF Lone Parenthood An Economic Analysis at 1. However, it is the United States, where 
the two parent household with the husband the sole breadwinner constitutes less than 10% of American 
families (Sinclair J The Law of Marriage at 6 ftn 5), which has the highest incidence of one-parent 
families in the world. Ermisch ibid. 
51n USA, Weitzman L "The Divorce Law Revolution and the Illusion of Equality : A view from the United 
States" in Freeman(ed) Essays in Family Law 1985 - Current Legal Problems notes at 106 that only 
18% of the nearly 10 million female-headed families are headed by an unwed mother, whereas over 
50% are headed by divorced mothers and the remaining 31% by separated mothers. See also Ermisch 
ibid who comments at 7 that of the total increase in one-parent families in Britain between 1971 and 
1984, 71% is attributable to the increase in the number of divorced or separated mothers. Furthermore, 
according to the Market Research Africa's March 1996 Report as quoted in "Failed by their Fathers" 
Although definitions vary, according to common usage, a one-parent family may be 
described as a "parent with her (his) dependent children, either living as a separate 
household or living in the household of others"6• The vast majority of these single 
parent families are headed by women,7 and this discussion will accordingly focus on 
these female-headed households. 
The increase in female-headed households has been the major cause of the 
phenomenon known as the "feminisation of poverty" which describes a situation 
where women make up the majority of the poor6. The feminisation of poverty has 
been noted by analysts since the early 1980s and sociologist Diana Pearce, who 
coined the phrase, was one of the first to point to the critical link between poverty and 
divorce for women.9 Indeed, a common factor in female-headed households after 
divorce, where, most commonly, the woman has custody of the minor children, is the 
extent to which they are financially impoverished 10 • 
Indeed, the feminisation of poverty is a major social problem that desperately needs 
to be addressed. In the United States where 90% of single-parent families are 
headed by women, half of these families remain below the poverty line. 11 In South 
Africa too, within all race groups, female-headed households are significantly poorer 
than average households.12 
Tribute newspaper 03-06-96 at 39, almost half of South African marriages end in divorce and over half 
of all township homes are now run by women. 
6Ermisch ibid at 5. 
7
"This fact is reflected in Hahlo's definition, namely that "it is one where the child lives with its mother 
while the Father's parental obligations are reduced to the duty to make appropriate financial 
contributions to the child's maintenance." Hahlo HR "Recent trends in family law: a global survey" 1983 
Acta Juridica at 16. 
80'Connell supra n1 at 60. 
9Diana Pierce, "The Feminisation of Poverty: Women, Work and Welfare," Urban and Social Change 
Review, February 1978; and Diana Pierce and Harriette McAdoo, "Women and Children: Alone and in 
poverty" (Washington DC: National Advisory Council on Economoic Opportunity. September 1981) at 1. 
10Ermisch supra n4 concludes at 19 that one-parent families are clearly poorer than two parent families 
and Weitzman supra n5 at 106 notes further that after divorce, single parent households headed by 
women, experience a 73% decline in their standard of living in the first year after divorce, while their 
former husbands experience a 42% rise in their standard of living. 
11 Rhode DJ Justice and Gender: Sex Discrimination and the Law at 126. She also notes that studies 
have shown that women are twice as likely as men to be poor and that female single parents are five 
times as likely as men to be poor. Furthermore, in England, Eekelaar Jand Maclean M Maintenance 
After Divorce 1986 at 68, 90-9 report that only 11 % of divorced single mothers enjoyed incomes above 
the poverty line compared with 71 % of the general population. 
12The project for statistics on the living standards and development of 1993 found that the average total 
household income for female-headed households was R1 141.00 per month compared to R2 089.00 
for all households, although women now constitute nearly 40% of all employees in formal employment 
in South Africa. Clark C "Gender Issues" Family Law Service at 10. 
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Some of the poorest households, however, are those found in the rural areas of 
South Africa. 13 These households are headed by Black women and accordingly it 
becomes apparent that race is a factor that must be taken into account when 
analysing poverty trends. Sinclair14 confirms that Black women heading single-parent 
families in South Africa suffer more acutely than their white counterparts and she 
attributes this especially to the hardships experienced as a result of apartheid. 15 
While this discussion focuses on poverty-stricken women heading one parent 
families, it is necessary to draw attention to the plight of the children living within 
these structures for there is a clear and inevitable link between the feminisation of 
poverty and the "paedonisation of poverty". 16 Certainly, a woman's income has been 
shown to be vital to the well being of a child, for while a child's nutrition has been 
shown to correlate positively with the size of the mother's income; this is not the case 
for the father's. 17 
Major health problems have also been seen to plague the poverty-stricken female-
headed family and studies have shown that the majority of infant and child deaths are 
related to poor socio-economic conditions and could be prevented. 18 
In order to fully understand the nature and causes of the feminisation of poverty 
within single parent households headed by women, it is necessary, from a women's 
rights perspective, to reflect upon the disadvantageous position of women in the 
family and in society as a whole. 
Furthermore, while this discussion focuses on the economic problems facing single-
parent families, one needs to bear in mind that in addition to financial concerns, 
single parenthood and its heavy responsibilities also inevitably results in physical and 
emotional stress, loneliness and isolation. This further mitigates against any attempts 
to improve the position of the impoverished mother and her dependants. 
Impoverished single parent families in South Africa are highlighted and Africa's 
"special conditions of poverty, ignorance, disease and lack of political 
13Refer to "General Political Structure" in First South African Report to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Committee 1997 (Hereafter 
referred to as SA CEDAW Report) at 6. 
14Supra n4 at 141. 
15See infra at 17 and 18 for a discussion of such hardships. 
16De Jong M "New trends regarding the maintenance of spouses upon divorce" 1999 THRHR at 81; 
Hahlo supra n7 at 16. 
170'Connell supra n1 at 60. 
18Article 12 SA CEDAW Report supra n13at1. 
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sophistication"19 borne in mind as contributing towards female impoverishment within 
these households. The many cultural, social and religious factors which are seen to 
foster the feminisation of poverty are also discussed. 
What becomes apparent, is that there is an urgent need to address the many 
problems facing female-headed households, and real solutions need to be found in 
order to alleviate their impoverishment. This discussion analyses the many varied 
factors contributing to this impoverishment2° and canvasses some possible legal 
solutions which have been used world-wide in a bid to solve the poverty problem 
within these households.21 The focus then shifts to considering those legal solutions 
most appropriate for South Africa,22 and the Constitution23 is used as a backdrop 
against which to measure all possible scenarios. 
19See Nhlapo "International Protection of Human Rights and the Family: African Variations on a 
common theme" 1989 International Journal of Law and the Family at 6. 
20See Chapter One. 
21 See Chapter Two. 
22See Chapter Three. 
23Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (Hereafter referred to as 'The 
Constitution.") 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CAUSES OF THE PHENOMENON KNOWN AS THE 
"FEMINISATION OF POVERTY" 
1.1 GENDER INEQUALITY AND THE EXISTENCE OF THE PUBLIC I 
PRIVATE DISTINCTION WITHIN SOCIETY. 
Within society, the existence of the traditional public/private dichotomy, which 
involves a clear distinction being made between the male public world of work, legal 
activity, politics and culture and that of the private female world of the family and the 
home, where nurturing support is given for the separate public activities of men24 , has 
traditionally been enforced by the state. 
According to traditional liberal thinking that rejects state intrusion into private matters, 
there should be no state intervention into those issues falling within the private 
sphere. Michael Freeman25, notes however, that this ideology has denied protection 
to women, for "far from being a liberal stance, protecting areas of freedom, the 
insistence on the privacy of the family is designed to perpetuate male domination and 
female subordination, seen by the state as crucial to the assumed stability of the 
family unit." 
Zearfoss26 confirms that the private sphere is that area of private relations where 
women are furthest from attaining equality, and yet, this is precisely the area that 
legal reforms have traditionally ignored. Issues such as domestic violence, child care, 
family planning, the marital relationship and various deeply ingrained societal 
perceptions and prejudices, are recognised as some of the most pressing concerns 
for women today, but because states have defined them as private, they are often 
outside the scope of government control.27 
Indeed, current Western Feminist theory holds that economic and psychological 
discrimination are two critical factors responsible for the disadvantageous position of 
women in society. Both factors are seen to exist primarily within the private world of 
the family; economically, women are disadvantaged by their double role (as 
24See Charlesworth H "The Public/Private Distinction and the Right to Development in International 
Law" 1992 Australian Yearbook of International Law at 190. 
25Quoted by Sinclair supra n4 at 20. 
26See "Note, the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; Radical, 
Reasonable, or Reactionary" 1991 Michigan Journal of International Law 903 at 904. 
271bid. 
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reproducers of children in the biological sense and of the labour force in the wider 
sense) of supporting and servicing their male breadwinners and psychologically, 
marriage and the family are seen as prisons in which the women's psychological 
inferiority is imbibed and ensured.28 Sinclair points out that feminist writings have 
attributed the subordination of women mainly to their child care responsibilities and to 
their inability to achieve economic equality with men in employment, despite formal 
equality in our law.29 
In the workplace, the premise is that the ideal worker is a man with no child care 
responsibilities whereas the accepted role for a woman is that of child-carer and 
homemaker. Accordingly, women are socialised into believing that any work 
commitment on their part is subsidiary and must be defined in such a way so as to 
take into account their child-care responsibilities. Indeed, Catherine O'Donovan 
points out that the public/private distinction fosters economic and social subordination 
of women by deeming the qualities necessary for success in the home unnecessary, 
even unsuitable for the workplace, and by entrenching the idea that women in the 
home are inevitable because of their different reproductive capacity. 30 
Marriage itself also contributes to the economic inequalities between men and women 
and to the different structural opportunities that the two spouses face at divorce.31 
With married women giving priority to their family roles and married men giving 
priority to their careers, women often forgo further education and occupational gain 
for homemaking and childcare. Married men on the other hand give priority to their 
careers acquiring more education and on-the-job experience. As a result, women find 
themselves being unable to compete on the same level as men in the employment 
market. Their earning capacity is also diminished, while the earning capacity of men 
is enhanced. Girls are also raised by their parents to assume their stereotyped role, 
with parents preferring to invest in the skills of their sons in order to prepare them for 
successful financial careers as adults. 
The outcome of all this is that women tend to select lower paid, part time 
employment in order to "fit in" with their allocated household responsibilities and out 
28Nhlapo supra n19 Indeed, many feminist writers have drawn attention to the hierarchical and 
patriarchal structure of most family types. 
29 Supra n4 at 28. 
30Sinclair supra n4 at 19. 
31 Brigitte Clark "History of the Roman-Dutch law of marriage from a socio-economic perspective" in 
Visser DP (ed) Essays on the History of Law (1989) at 159 highlights women's weaker financial 
position and notes that "women's need for financial support results frequently from the disabilities 
imposed on them during marriage." 
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of economic necessity rather than with a view to establishing careers. 32 Furthermore, 
with many of these positions offering less opportunity for advancement, the prospect 
of developing a stable career is drastically diminished. The low wages paid to women 
also weaken their position in the labour market and maintain their economic 
dependence on men which in turn becomes the rationale for women's ongoing 
responsibility for housework and liberates men for better, higher-paid and more 
secure positions. Sinclair describes the oppression of women as taking the form of a 
circle of impoverishment where 
'The greater the disparity between husband and wife in economic resources, the 
greater the husband.'s dominance in decision-making is likely to be. Disadvantage is 
then compounded by the fact that the inferior vocational advancement, and hence 
financial status, and hence decision-making power experienced by a woman, fosters 
further unfair distribution between her and her husband of domestic burdens such as 
child care and care of the aged - which in turn further limits her occupational 
advancement." 33 
Paid domestic work is an example of a major area of employment for women in 
South Africa and one for which they have the necessary skills. 34 It is, however always 
low-paid, low-prestige and often exploitative work which isolates women from other 
workers, but which is chosen because it is a ready means of earning an income. 
Furthermore, of those women who have employment, many are faced with 
continuing inequalities arising from past discrimination which is associated primarily 
with race and gender. 35 
The unfortunate consequence is that when the marriage terminates, the woman is left 
financially impoverished, unable to support herself or her children, and accordingly 
reliant on her ex-husband and the state for maintenance, being unable to attain a 
sufficient degree of economic independence. The above reality is often not taken into 
account by our judges, who have been shown to stereotype women as 
"Superwoman" i.e. "who despite years of unpaid labour in the home, can leap into 
the workforce upon divorce, fully equipped to earn a good living and care for her 
32 /bid at 139. 
33Sinclair supra n4 at 24. 
34Almost 20% of all employed women are in domestic service, and another 15% are in clerical jobs. See 
O'Regan "Equality at Work and the limits of the law: Symmetry and individualism in anti-discriminatory 
legislation" in Murray Gender and the New South African Legal Order at 65. 
351n South Africa the recent Employment Equity Act No 55 of 1998 reflects the need to redress these 
inequalities. 
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children with no help from others."36 Such stereotyping disadvantages women within 
the judicial process for it negatively influences the financial aspects of divorce 
settlements for them37and therefore contributes to their impoverishment. Weitzman's 
research in the USA also suggests that judges are unaware of the difficulties and 
costs of obtaining child care, unrealistically optimistic about women's job 
opportunities and very concerned about the husband's need to maintain a decent 
standard of living (and enough income).36 As a result, judges rarely order the husband 
to part with more than one-third of his income to support his wife and children. He 
therefore retains two-thirds of his income for himself, while his former wife and 
children are expected to live on the remaining third. As this proves impossible, other 
sources of state support must be sought.39 
1.2 THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION AND THE "NO-FAULT I CLEAN-
BREAK" APPROACH. 
This century40 has witnessed radical changes in Western society's view of marriage 
and divorce. Marriage was initially perceived to be a lifelong bond, with the husband 
universally seen as the major breadwinner. Divorce was met with social censure and 
when it did occur, it was fault based i.e. implying that in every divorce action there 
was a guilty party and an innocent party, the naive assumption being that only one 
spouse, the innocent one, wanted a divorce and the guilty one was to be punished for 
his quasi-criminal behaviour. Where the wife was innocent, the husband as the guilty 
party was required to pay his wife maintenance until she died or remarried. If the wife 
was the guilty party, she forfeited her claims to support after divorce.41 
Today marriage is no longer viewed as a permanent union and divorce has become 
an established feature of modern life. Divorce based exclusively on fault has virtually 
disappeared from Western legal systems; it has been replaced by no-fault divorce. 
Accordingly, we have seen a shift from the matrimonial offence to marital breakdown 
as a ground of divorce. 
360'Sullivan M "Stereotyping and male identification: "Keeping women in their place"" in Murray supra 
n34 at 188. 
37 Ibid at189. 
36weitzman Supra n5 at 97. 
39 /bid. 
40Particularly the post World-War Two period - see Hahlo supra n 7 at 1. 
41 Hahlo ibid at 2. 
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In the United States, this "legal revolution in divorce"42 was launched in California, in 
1970, when that state instituted the first no-fault divorce law. South African law took 
far longer to modernise and it was only in 1979 that the Divorce Act43 was enacted in 
order to substitute marital breakdown for fault as the main ground for divorce.44 
Weitzman45 notes that these no-fault divorce laws undercut the old system of alimony 
and property awards for "innocent" spouses46 They also created new norms for 
dividing property and awarding alimony thereby treating wives as full and equal 
partners in the marital relationship. The object of social policy was no longer to 
compensate a wronged wife for the break up of her marriage, but to achieve as soon 
as possible self sufficiency and a clean break; where the aim was to terminate the 
financial obligations between the spouses as soon as possible. This approach 
involved making awards for interim maintenance if the circumstances deemed it 
necessary, while the possibility of permanent alimony was ruled out. Indeed, with 
women's growing workforce participation and formal gender equality having been 
attained, the very concept of support was deemed to be archaic. 
In the USA the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act of 1970 adopted the "clean break" 
as its primary objective. Following divorce, there would be no continuing obligation 
from one spouse to another. The only surviving relationship would be with the 
children. To the extent that one spouse needed assistance, an adjustment in the 
property division, rather than a support or maintenance award was preferred because 
the property division could be finalised with the divorce. 
In its report in 1981, the English Law Commission also recommended that greater 
weight be given to the importance of each spouse becoming self-sufficient and 
achieving a once and for all settlement and the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings 
Act of 1984 incorporated these principles. According to Sinclair47 the Act was 
premised on the belief that divorced women were living (parasitically) off their former 
husbands, when in fact there was little, if any evidence that this was happening. The 
aim of the Act was therefore to abolish the mythical "meal ticket for life" for divorced 
42See generally Weitzman The Divorce Law Revolution: The unexpected Social and Economic 
Consequences for women and Children in America (1985). 
43Act 70 of 1979 (Hereafter referred to as the "Divorce Act"). 
44Section three creates two grounds for divorce: irretrievable breakdown and mental illness or 
continuous unconsciousness. 
45Supra n5 at 81. 
46With the shift from fault to failure as a ground of divorce, the justification for linking the duty to pay 
maintenance after divorce to "guilt" has disappeared. Need became the basis upon which maintenance 
is based. 
47 Supra n4 at 148. 
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women and it accordingly reduced the liability for maintenance by ex-husbands of 
their ex-wives. The effect of this was that divorced women continued to become more 
and more dependent on the state in order to support their one-parent families. But the 
curtailment of the private maintenance obligation was not compensated for by 
increased benefits from the state; for while women became entitled to the same 
National Insurance benefits as men, the value of these benefits declined for everyone 
and became less significant as a source of income maintenance. And so, although 
formal equality was attained for divorced women, this was coupled with increasing 
poverty. 
The "clean break" principle was also applied in Germany where the right to 
maintenance was restricted to exceptional cases by the Marriage Law Reform Act of 
1977.48 
In South Africa, the High Court in Beaumont v Beaumont49 held that there is no doubt 
that our courts will exercise their powers to impose a clean break subject to the 
important qualification that the circumstances permitted it. 50 And the way the "clean 
break" is probably best achieved in SA is to grant only a redistribution order in terms 
of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act (provided of course that the facts permit this) and 
grant no maintenance order in terms of sec 7(2) of the same Act. 51 
According to Weitzman, the major unanticipated and unintended result of the no-fault 
reforms and emphasis on a "clean break", has been widespread disruption and 
increased poverty for divorced women and their children. In analysing the reasons 
therefor, Weitzrnan52 points to the fact that when the legal system treats men and 
women "equally" at divorce, it ignores the very real economic inequalities that 
marriage creates. It also ignores the economic inequalities between men and women 
in larger society. 
48Sinclair ibid. 
491987 1 SA 976 A. See also Archer 1989 2 SA 885 E. 
50Such circumstances as forseen by the English Law Commission were: in a brief, childless marriage 
where the wife had an income or earning capacity; and also in a long marriage where there was enough 
capital to divide. 
51 See Van Zyl L "Maintenance" Family Law Service at 17. This is what was ordered in Archer supra. In 
Beaumont supra at 993 G-H it was noted that the court a quo had considered granting only a 
redistribution order but had decided against this because the payment of a capital sum by the husband 
would have been too onerous for him as well as being insufficient for the wife and her children's needs. 
52Supra n5 at 83. 
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Sinclair, who is also critical of the trend towards applying the "clean-break" principle, 
points out that "equality in theory has resulted in inequality in practice."53 She 
comments that arguments for the abolition of maintenance "ignore the fact that the 
ideology of equality has not been followed by material equality ... and that division of 
property helps only those with property."54 According to Sinclair, the problem is that 
post-divorce maintenance is still relied on by many divorced women, not only for their 
own support, but for the support of the children in their custody. Indeed, many of 
these women have the full time job of caring for the couple's children after divorce, 
have also taken over many of their husband's family responsibilities and face greater 
burdens and greater expenses as single parents. Even if many divorced mothers 
wanted to be self sufficient, their economic reality compels continuing support from 
their former husbands. And so, as noted by Clark55, it is clear that the "clean break" 
principle is inconsistent with this ongoing duty of support towards children. Indeed, it 
may be said that the main cause of impoverishment in female-headed households is 
inadequate child support56 and the absence of spousal support as well, makes it 
further impossible for divorced mothers to extricate themselves and their families 
from their poverty-stricken circumstances. 
1.3 CONSEQUENCES OF THE DIFFERENT MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY 
SYSTEMS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Prior to the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984,57 if parties to a marriage did not 
enter into an antenuptial contract, their marriage was deemed to be in community of 
property, profit and loss, and the wife was subject to her husband's marital power. 
Under this system the spouses shared a common estate which fell under the control 
of the husband. Each of the parties was entitled to an undivided half share in the joint 
estate. To this extent, the wife was assured of a share in the estate, although it was 
the husband who exercised full control of the estate during the marriage; he alone 
had full contractual capacity and he bound the joint estate by contracts, whether they 
were good or bad. 
53Sinclair J "Marriage: is it still a commitment for life entailing a lifelong duty of support?" 1983 Acta 
Juridica at 81. See also Kaganas and Murray "Law and Women's rights in South Africa: An overview" 
in Murray supra n34 at 14. 
54 Sinclair ibid. 
55Clark B "Child support: Public or Private?" 1992 THRHR 277 at 278. 
56 /bid at 279. 
57Hereafter referred to as the "Matrimonial Property Act." 
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By entering into an antenuptial contract, one could exclude the undesirable 
consequences of universal community of property. The disadvantage, however, was 
that while the wife was able to enjoy independent legal and contractual capacity 
during the marriage, she was not entitled to any share of her husband's estate on 
termination. This was so in spite of the essential role played by her in caring for the 
children and acting as housekeeper, while her husband was able to pursue a career 
and build up substantial assets of his own. The unfortunate consequence was that 
many women were seen to emerge from failed marriages, with little or no assets, no 
job, little or no chance of successfully entering or re-entering the labour market in 
middle age and the responsibility of caring for the children of the marriage, typically 
also battling to secure the payment of maintenance from absent fathers. This failure 
to ensure the equitable distribution and sharing of property on divorce resulted in 
tremendous hardship and was a major cause of poverty in female-headed families. 
In order to mitigate the above-mentioned harsh consequences of the two systems, 
the Matrimonial Property Act came into force on 1 November 1984. This Act 
attempted to combine the advantages of both matrimonial property systems and to 
eliminate the disadvantages. It sought to achieve this by retaining the community 
system but in a modified form,58 curtailing the husband's marital power so that both 
parties had equal rights of administration over the joint estate59 and by introducing the 
accrual system as part of the antenuptial contract.60 
The accrual system, which involves calculating the difference between the accruals 
in the respective estates of the spouses and sharing it equally,61 amounts to a 
deferred sharing of profits62 Sinclair notes that the introduction of the accrual system 
has definitely eased the plight of impoverished wives, entitling them to "share" on 
divorce. She does, however point out that the accrual system is frequently excluded 
in antenuptial contracts, in situations where for example, the wife is ignorant of what 
is involved and where it is the husband (or the husband's father) who has instructed 
the attorney. 63 
With regard to marriages concluded before 1 November 1994 in terms of an 
antenuptial contract by which the community of property, profit and loss, as well as 
58See sections 14-17. 
59See sections 11 and 12. 
60See sections 2-10. 
61 See sections 3 and 4. 
62Sinclair supra n4 at 142. 
63Where for example, the parties are young and the prospects of increased wealth for the husband are 
good. 
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accrual sharing in any form, are excluded, the court is empowered in terms of 
section 7(3) of the Divorce Act to grant a redistribution order. Such an order involves 
the ordering of one spouse to transfer certain assets, or part thereof to the other. The 
court's discretion is thus restricted and limited to only a small group of marriages. It 
will come to an end once all marriages entered into prior to these Acts have been 
dissolved. 
The operation of the judicial discretion has saved many divorced women from 
financial disaster, "and society from some of its many penurious one-parent 
families"64 But the question arises: what about those marriages entered into after the 
commencement of the two Acts which don't incorporate any form of sharing? We 
have already seen that the accrual system is frequently excluded by the more 
dominant party (frequently the husband) in whose best interests it is to do so. As a 
result, a group of people (mostly women) has been seen to emerge that is just as 
vulnerable as those people targeted by the Acts - but which is denied the relief 
granted to its counterparts who luckily married before the cut-off dates.65 
1.4 MAINTENANCE 
The maintenance system in South Africa consists of the private judicial maintenance 
system, which is based on the legal duty to support one's dependants and the state 
maintenance system, which is intended to act as a safety net, supporting children and 
dependent persons when the private judicial system fails to do so. Many problems 
and shortcomings have been apparent in both systems and have undoubtedly 
contributed to the feminisation of poverty. In its report in 1996, the Lund Committee 
on Child and Family Support 66 identified several areas where the law of maintenance 
and its administration was in need of reform and also recommended changes to the 
state maintenance system. In July 1997, on the basis of this report, the South African 
Law Commission67 conducted a review of the maintenance system68 in order to 
investigate the operation of the Maintenance Act 23 of 1963 and to recommend steps 
64Sinclair supra n4 at 144 ft 385. 
65Sinclair ibid criticizes the selective operation of the discretion and submits it should be extended. See 
infra at 28 for further discussion. 
66Hereafter referred to as the "Lund Report." 
67Hereafter referred to as the "SALC". 
681ssue paper 5 project 100: "Review of the maintenance system" (Hereafter referred to as the "SALC 
Maintenance Report"). 
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to try to ensure a more effective maintenance system. Their investigations led to the 
promulgation of the new Maintenance Act 99 of 1998.69 
1.4.1 PRIVATE JUDICIAL MAINTENANCE 
Maintenance is regulated by the Divorce Act which makes provision for court orders 
relating to maintenance70 and the division of assets71 and the maintenance court 
hears all maintenance applications. 
Burman and Berger72note that a great deal of patience and perseverance is required 
of most women when using the maintenance system; lengthy delays, lack of 
personnel, loss of work hours and high transport costs due to frequent appearances 
in the maintenance office and court increase costs. Child care arrangements are also 
frequently problematic. Clark73 also brings to our attention the fact that there have 
been many complaints about the treatment, attitudes and facilities available at the 
maintenance courts. 
As a result of the delays, expense and frustration generally associated with making a 
maintenance application, women are often discouraged from doing so, especially 
because, even if they do take the time and go to the trouble and expense of getting a 
maintenance order, compliance therewith cannot be guaranteed. Similarly, they will 
also be loathe to approach the court again at a later date for a much needed increase 
in amount (which, at the outset, is often woefully inadequate). These women 
accordingly face an ongoing and uphill battle to attain the means sufficient to support 
and raise their children. 
With regard to the amount of maintenance awarded, Burman and Berger's research 
indicates that in South Africa, generally, such amounts are small and inadequate. 74 
Weitzman too, confirms that insufficient maintenance awards appear to be a world-
wide problem.75 During Burman and Berger's research, they found that the attitude of 
many of the maintenance officials was that high maintenance awards result in a 
69Hereafter referred to as the "1998 Maintenance Act." Discussed infra at 33 and 34. 
70Secs 7(1) and (2). 
71 Secs 7(3)-(6). 
72Burman S and Berger S "When Family Support Fails: The Problems of Maintenance Payments in 
Apartheid South Africa: Part One and Part Two" 19884SAJHR194-206 and 334-354 at 197. 
73Clark B 'The new Maintenance Bill" De Rebus December 1998 63 at 64. 
74 Supra n72 at 204. See also Clark Ibid. 
75Weitzman supra n5 at 97. 
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higher likelihood of default and that small maintenance payments are preferable to no 
maintenance at all. Accordingly, during maintenance negotiations, women are often 
persuaded to accept a low amount offered by a man, on the grounds that they always 
have the option of asking for an increase at a later date. As we have seen, due to the 
difficulties inherent in this process, this does not often occur. 
Vast discrepancies in the amounts awarded in the different courts have also been 
brought to light.76 This is due to the fact that decisions concerning how much 
maintenance to award are made largely at the discretion of the officials concerned 
and the criteria used vary, with incorrect assumptions sometimes being made. 77 The 
decision whether or not to proceed with a maintenance inquiry is also at the 
discretion of the maintenance officer and this was perceived as a major problem by 
the SALC,78 since some officers fail to proceed without adequate reasons. 
And so, maintenance officers are seen to act incompetently at times, to the detriment 
of the women involved; no wonder, as recent studies have shown that only a small 
part of their training is devoted to maintenance issues and many of their course notes 
are apparently out of date.79 They also receive no gender-sensitivity training and may 
not be aware of the costs involved in raising a child. Furthermore, they are not trained 
\ 
in accountancy to understand the income and assets issues on which they must 
decide.80 
A major problem world-wide that significantly contributes to the impoverishment of 
these single parent families headed by women, is the failure of those liable parents -
typically fathers - to comply with their maintenance obligations and to support their 
families with whom they do not live. 81 Burman and Berger note that while high rates 
of default on maintenance payments are a universal phenomenon82 their research 
indicates particularly high percentages of men failing to pay in South Africa. 83 
Non compliance with a maintenance order may be as a result of negative feelings of 
bitterness or hostility towards the ex-spouse.04 Lack of contact with the children may 
76See Burman and Berger supra n72 at 203 and 4. 
77Refer to Burman and Berger ibid .at 204 for examples. 
78see SALC Maintenance Report supra n68 at paras 4.26 and 4.27. 
79Lund Report at 57. 
80Lund Report at 54. 
81 See Sinclair supra n4 at 149. 
82Confirmed by Weitzman supra n5 at 97. 
83Burman and Berger supra n72 at 340. 
84Certainly the adversarial nature of divorce proceedings which heightens the tension and widens the 
communication gap between the parties on divorce, mitigates against attaining a co-operative and 
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also be a given reason, or, very often, it is simply the social attitude that there is no 
responsibility upon persons to support their dependants, especially where children 
are brought up in single-parent households.65 The low measure of social disapproval 
with which a non-custodial parent's failure to support his/her children is met 
(especially if the non-custodial parent is the father) is indicative of this attitude. This 
attitude has permeated not only our society, but also the administration of our 
maintenance system.66 Sinclair points out67 , however, that default is not always a 
reflection of the morality of the debtor; indeed, with our poor economic climate and 
high rates of unemployment, a large proportion of men simply cannot pay. Many are 
required to support a second family and the bottom line is: their resources are totally 
inadequate to meet their obligations of support. 
In South Africa, the principal means of enforcing a maintenance order is by a criminal 
prosecution for a contravention of the Maintenance Act; it being intended that the 
threat of criminal sanction be enough to ensure compliance. However, it has become 
routine practice for courts to simply suspend sentences for the failure to comply with 
a maintenance order66 and accordingly, the criminal sanctions have lost their efficacy. 
Furthermore, an order which, prior to the 1998 Maintenance Act, could only be made 
upon conviction for the failure to comply with a maintenance order, is the garnishee 
order, which authorises the payment of maintenance from the offender's earnings. 
Unfortunately these orders do not cater for self-employed persons and they lose their 
effectiveness if the offender changes employment. 69 
What becomes apparent from the above discussion is the fact that the judicial 
maintenance system is ineffective in ensuring that support is given to those entitled 
thereto.90 The consequence is that increasing numbers of impoverished people are 
turning to the State Maintenance Grant as their means of subsistence.91 This places 
great strain on the already limited welfare resources of South Africa. 
workable post-divorce relationship. Refer infra at 36 where divorce mediation as an alternative is 
discussed. 
65SALC Maintanance Report supra n68 at 5. 
66 /bid at 6. 
67 Supra n4 at 149. 
66SALC Maintenance Report supra n 68 at 26. SvBotha 1988 4 SA 402 Cat 40 E-G. 
69See Burman and Berger supra n72 at 205. Clark supra n73 at 67 submits that the order could be 
improved by being structured in such a way that it does not apply to a specific employer. 
90The Maintenance Act of 1998 attempts to address many of the shortcomings outlined above, 
however, as discussed infra at 33 and 34, further reform is still required. 
91 Lund Report at 49. 
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1.4.2 STATE MAINTENANCE 
In its report in 1996, the Lund Committee made recommendations for the 
replacement of the then current state maintenance grant system92 This system, which 
had successfully reached a small proportion of poor mothers in need of support 
(primarily Coloured, Indian and White), but had omitted the poorest majority·, rural 
African women and children, 93 was to be substituted by a flat rate child support benefit 
with other welfare grants being continued.94 As a result of this, the Welfare Laws 
Amendment Act 106 of 1997 was enacted in terms of which the new child support 
grant came into effect on 1 April 1998, entitling the primary caregivers of children 
under the age of seven to a grant of R100 per month per child.95 While it is clear that 
the new grant system attempts to 'do the greatest good for the greatest number', 
many concerns and criticisms have been raised, for instance, the grant is a small 
allocation when one considers that 87% of children under 12 are nutritionally 
compromised.96 Furthermore, Naidoo and Bozalek ask: "How meaningful is such a 
benefit in the absence of other inter-sectoral policy measures in place to include the 
needs of children from six years upwards and poor rural women/caregivers who are 
not targeted by the grant? Many women in poverty will be plunged into worse 
conditions. "97 
And so, to conclude, it is unfortunately very apparent that neither the private nor the 
state maintenance systems are successful in alleviating the phenomenon of the 
feminisation of poverty to any significant degree. 
1.5 THE EFFECTS OF APARTHEID 
After a long struggle against Apartheid, South Africa's first democratic elections took 
place in April 1994. A new government was elected. A new era had begun. Today, all 
laws and policies enacted to bolster the apartheid system have been removed from 
92Which involved paying mothers R700 per month, this comprising a R430 caregiver allowance and 
R 135 for each of two children from birth to the age of 18 years. Agenda "The Poverty Issue" No 33 of 
1997 at 30. 
93 Lund "Poverty alleviation and the Lund Committee" Agenda forum discussion 24 March1998 
{Durban). 
94Lund Report at 87. . 
95See s4; Also R418 reg 3, 9(3) Regulation Gazette 18771/31-3-1998 In terms of the regulations, a 
primary caregiver will qualify for the grant only if the income of the household of which he/she is a 
member is below R9600 per annum or, if the child and the primary caregiver live either in a rural area or 
in an informal dwelling, R13 200 per annum. {R413 reg 16, GG 18771/31-3-1998). 
96Agenda supra n92 at 31. 
97 /bid. 
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the statute books, some examples of which included the Population Registration 
Act98, the Group Areas Act99 and the Land Acts100 that denied black people fair access 
to immovable property. Those policies designed to deter urbanisation, such as those 
that retarded the provision of urban housing for Black people, are also now relics of 
an unfortunate past. 101 One cannot, however, afford to stop here; stringent measures 
to redress the considerable harm done must continue to be taken. 
The extent of the harm caused by Apartheid policies is far-reaching. For our 
purposes, it is clear that it was a major cause of the impoverishment of women 
heading single-parent families - especially in the rural areas where women and 
children dominate the population. 
Forced removals in terms of the Group Areas Act took many people from where they 
were living to dump them in poverty-stricken areas without services, infrastructure or 
adequate means of supporting themselves. Influx control and pass laws and 
regulations allowed African men to move to the "white" urban areas to work, but 
confined many African women to the poverty-stricken rural areas. Blacks were thus 
denied their traditional family-based support systems. They were also excluded from 
the mainstream of state-based social benefits. 102 Land ownership patterns and 
restrictions imposed by laws such as the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts also resulted in 
further hardships.103 The result in South Africa today is that those (mainly women) 
living in rural areas often have neither industrial nor commercial jobs, nor land on 
which to support themselves. They exist outside of the formal sector where they live 
below the subsistence level on the fringes of the economy, with no way out of the 
poverty in which they are trapped. 
1.6 AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 
Any discussion which includes an account of African society, must consider the 
traditional dimension, for the vast majority of African peoples live in rural areas and 
regard themselves as subjects of customary law. Unfortunately for women, 
customary law is seen to openly subordinate and discriminate against them. This 
98Act 30of1950. 
99Act 36of1966. 
1001e 1913 and 1936 Land Acts. 
101 Sinclair supra n4 at 10. 
102See Sachs A Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa 1990 at 67 where he points out that 
Whites recieved higher pensions as well as far more protection from unemployment insurance and 
workers' compensation law than Blacks. Discussed by Sinclair supra n4 at 26. 
103SA CEDAW Report Part 4 at 11. 
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immediately becomes apparent when one considers that in terms of customary law, 
women are always subjected to the authority of a patriarch, moving from the control 
of their guardians to that of their husbands. 104 The male head of the family represents 
the family and a woman cannot generally contract or litigate without assistance. 105 
Husbands control virtually all the family's property while women's rights are confined 
to personal items. 
Women are accordingly denied access to and rights in land and this is so in spite of 
the fact that African women are the ones labouring in both subsistence and cash crop 
agriculture. This unfortunate fact is a key contributing factor world-wide to women's 
inability to overcome poverty. 106 
Women are also precluded from inheriting property because "custom" dictates that 
control of property accrues to men, and so as widows, they are often left destitute, 
with male relatives (in the name of custom) forcing them from family property and 
failing to support the surviving family as "custom" theoretically requires. 107 
With regard to the termination of a customary union by divorce, in terms of customary 
law, the husband retains a reserved right to initiate the divorce process, while a 
woman cannot procure a divorce on her own. She is dependent on her male guardian 
who received the lobolo (bride-wealth), to negotiate the divorce on her behalf. She 
will return to her parents' home with only her possessions, to be re-absorbed into the 
family. Any property acquired during the marriage would remain with her husband to 
form part of his estate. 
Furthermore, under customary law, the husband is not required to pay any 
maintenance for his ex-wife, the traditional justification being that lobolo, which had 
already been paid on marriage, should theoretically still be available as security for 
the wife, to be used in case of divorce. It is clear, however, that this real purpose of 
lobolo has become greatly distorted, for today, it often takes the form of cash 
settlements, and this money is often used up in meeting ordinary day to day 
expenses and existing debts. Divorced customary wives are thus left impoverished 
with no means to support themselves and their families. 
104See Bennet TW African Customary Law at 167 and 228. 
1051bid at 328-9 and 330-1. 
106SA CEDAW Report part 4 at 11. 
107Cooke R (ed) Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives. (1994) at 101. 
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Many of the objectionable features of African Customary Law which undoubtedly may 
be said to have contributed to the feminisation of poverty, have been addressed by 
the new Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998.108 Some of its 
commendable features include section 6 which declares that women have in all 
respects a status equal to that of their husbands. Equality between the spouses is 
thereby entrenched. With regard to the dissolution of a marriage, 1°9 divorce 
proceedings may be instituted by either spouse and marriages can only be 
terminated by decree of the court on the basis of an irretrievable breakdown. 
Furthermore, where there is no other customary marriage, the marriage is 
automatically in community of property, 110 and accordingly, there is equal sharing of 
property unless the parties agree otherwise. The institution of lobolo is retained, but 
where it was once an integral component of the marriage ceremony, it is now an 
optional accessory. Furthermore, while the Act does not expressly prohibit polygyny, 
it assists the wife in a polygynous relationship by providing structures to regulate 
conduct and create protections for the wife, by, for example, providing for the 
registration of customary marriages. 111 
108Hereafter referred to as the "Customary Marriages Act." Note: word limit does not permit an in 
depth analysis of this Act. 
109See section 8. 
110See section 7(2). 
111See section 4. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
WORLDWIDE, GENERAL LEGAL SOLUTIONS TO THE 
PROBLEM OF THE FEMINISATION OF POVERTY 
Thus far, the widespread post-divorce economic suffering of women heading single-
parent families has been established and it has been shown that this suffering has 
resulted from a number of factors, some of which will prove to be easier to remedy 
than others. Some of the possible legal solutions to the feminisation of poverty will 
now be analysed. What will become apparent from such an analysis is that the 
impoverishment suffered by single-parent families is not an inevitable post-divorce 
consequence; living in such a family does not have to mean financial hardship for its 
members. 112 
In recent years there have been many suggestions for combating the feminisation of 
poverty. Many of these have focused on changes in the labour market. There has 
also been a great emphasis on increasing social welfare benefits and many legal 
systems have developed sophisticated social security systems to alleviate the 
poverty and hardship caused by the breakdown of intimate relationships. Another 
possibility is also to change the way that the courts allocate property and income at 
divorce113 and Sinclair notes that many legal systems have modified their law of 
matrimonial property to ensure that on divorce women share the assets built up 
during the marriage. 114 A further option is also to refine the law compelling private 
maintenance. 
2.1 SOCIAL SECURITY 
In an attempt to alleviate the poverty of one-parent families, elaborate social security 
systems have been designed and set up in many jurisdictions. The duty of support 
has thus been seen to shift from the husbands to the state. 115 
In 1974 in England, the Finer Committee reported on various ways to alleviate the 
problem of poverty-stricken single-parent families. 116 The report suggested that a 
112See Weitzman supra n5 at 105. 
113/bid at 107. 
114Sinclair Supra n4 at 141. 
115Sinclair ibid at 150. 
116See generally Report of the Committee on one-parent families (vol 1) 1972. 
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guaranteed maintenance allowance should be payable to all one-parent families, 
irrespective of the reason for the absence of one parent. The state would have the 
right to claim a contribution from the liable parent but it would be the primary source 
of support for the child and the custodial parent. 117 Due to financial reasons, this 
proposal was not adopted in England, however it has been seen to run fairly 
successfully in New Zealand 118where domestic purposes benefits are payable to 
single parents who have one or more dependants. 119 An obligation is imposed on a 
parent who is liable to support a dependant child, to contribute towards the cost of the 
benefit and if he fails to make the required contribution, the social welfare authorities 
can seek to recover it as a debt. What becomes apparent from this system is that it is 
no longer assumed that children should look primarily to the resources of absent 
parents to determine their standard of living; the state has decided what these living 
standards should be and it provides uniform criteria for all children in single-parent 
families. 120 
In Sweden, socio-economic policy aims to redistribute resources in favour of families 
with children and although parents remain obliged to support their children (including 
step-children), parental obligations have been far less onerous since 1978, with the 
state's role ever increasing. Indeed, Clark notes121 that both public and private law 
support regimes are child centred. The premise is that a child, one of whose parents 
is absent, has a special need for support which the state provides. 
A contrary approach has emerged in England, where in setting up a child support 
agency to trace absent fathers122, the British government is seen to be reluctant to 
subsidise child care costs any further. 123 
In assessing the role that the state should play in assisting female-headed families, it 
may be argued that "public interest" is against extensive state support of these 
families - the taxpayer/public being reluctant to finance other people's divorce or to 
allow absent fathers to avoid their obligations to their children. Furthermore, one 
needs to bear in mind the traditional public/private dichotomy which upholds the 
liberal philosophy that the state should not intrude into those areas considered to be 
117 Clark supra n55 at 281. 
118Clark Ibid. 
1191n terms of sec 6 of their Social Security Act 1973. 
120Clark supra n55 at 282. 
121 Ibid. 
122The agency has powers to prescribe the method by which maintenance payments are made and can 
order the attachment of earnings. A standard formula also assesses the amount a parent should be 
liable to pay. See Clark ibid. 
123Clark ibid at 282. 
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private. Whatever the merits of these arguments, they become overshadowed by the 
desperate needs of impoverished single-parent families that must be met. 
Certainly, the appropriate philosophy behind social welfare law needs to be worked 
out in every jurisdiction and in particular the relationship between private 
maintenance, public law and children's rights. 124 Perhaps the optimum mix/outcome is 
for parents to remain primarily responsible to ensure suitable living conditions, but 
that the state should be obliged in cases of need to provide material assistance and 
support programs, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing and to 
take all appropriate measures to secure the recovery of maintenance for the child. 
2.2 THE SHARING OF ASSETS AND INCOME AT DIVORCE 
With regard to the legal remedy of sharing assets and income at divorce, Sinclair 
notes125 that German law achieved this by a system of deferred sharing of acquests 
(Zugewinngemeinschaft) and equalisation of pension benefits 
(Versorgungsausgleich). 
English law reformed by creating a judicial discretion to redistribute property on 
divorce. This was achieved by the enactment of the Matrimonial Proceedings and 
Property Act of 1970. By mitigating_ the consequences of a matrimonial property 
regime which involved a strict separation of property, the Act recognised marriage as 
a partnership. It introduced a judicial discretion on divorce, thereby making it possible 
for assets such as the matrimonial home as well as business assets of the husband 
to be share~ on divorce. Its aim was that the parties should as far as possible be 
placed in a position as if the marriage had not broken down. 126 
In America, almost all states, regardless of whether they are common law states121or 
community property states, also allow divorce courts the discretion to divide the 
accumulations of the parties during marriage, and to award alimony. 
South African law, by virtue of the addition of the accrual system126 to our then 
existing matrimonial property systems, and sec 7(3)129 of the Divorce Act which 
124/bid. 
125Sinclair supra n4 at 141. 
126Sinclair ibid ft 379. This Act was however later amended by the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings 
Act of 1984. See postea at 9. 
1271e states that have adopted English rules regarding marital property. 
126Discussed postea at 12. 
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permits the court a limited discretion to redistribute property, contains elements of 
both types of sharing. We thus have structured matrimonial property rules as well as 
a judicial discretion existing to determine the outcome of property division on divorce. 
It is submitted that this combined approach is suitable for South Africa, 130 however in 
order for the harshness of the structured matrimonial systems to be mitigated, it will 
be necessary for the judicial discretion to be extended. 131 
However, although it is clear that various legal systems do, in different ways, make 
provision for the equitable allocation of resources following divorce, in many 
instances, this does not prove to be a particularly significant potential remedy for the 
impoverished single mother. For research has indicated that most divorcing couples 
have very little property to divide. 132 In America, most have cars, furniture or TV sets, 
but only half own or are purchasing a home at the time of divorce.133 Furthermore, 
much of the tangible property owned has a low monetary value. 
What has become apparent is that instead of accumulating traditional types of family 
property, divorcing couples today have invested in something else - namely the 
benefits derived from employment termed the "new property". Their real wealth lies in 
this type of investment and consists of their "career assets" described by Weitzman 134 
as those tangible and intangible assets that are acquired as a part of either spouse's 
career or career potential. The assets include pension and retirement benefits, a 
licence to practice a profession or trade, medical and hospital insurance, the goodwill 
of a business, and entitlements to company goods and services. 135 
These career assets acquired during marriage (their value being the lifetime value of 
the spouse's increase in earning capacity that occurred during marriage) are often far 
more valuable than the tangible assets acquired and Weitzman argues that they 
should accordingly be included in the marital estate to be divided at divorce. She 
bases this viewpoint on two premises, firstly that career assets are joint property 
acquired in much the same way as other property currently recognised as marital 
property by the courts and secondly, that it is impossible to have an equal or 
129Discussed postea at 12 and 13. 
1301ndeed, Oldham J T "The Economic Consequences of Divorce in the United States" in Frontiers of 
Family Law (ed Bainham and Pearl) at 152 is of the opinion that a stark choice between rules and 
discretion is unrealistic and that one needs to search for the optimal mix. See also Sinclair supra n4 at 
146. 
131 See infra at 28 and 29. 
132See Oldham supra n130 at 142. 
133/bid. See also Weitzman supra n42 at 108-9. 
134Weitzman ibid at 110. 
135/bid. 
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equitable division of marital property if these assets are excluded; for to exclude 
career assets is to "skew the apportionment in favour of the primary working spouse, 
and to assure an inequitable and unfair division of marital property. 136 
However, not all legal commentators are in favour of widening the traditional concept 
of property to include career assets137 and some of the objections relate to the 
contingent nature of career assets, 136 while others focus on the difficulty of calculating 
their value. 139 
Although Oldham is one academic cautious of including career assets in the marital 
estate, he does recognise the concept of "career damage" incurred during the 
marriage due to family obligations. 140 He notes that career damage due to roles 
assumed during marriage can be substantial and submits that the private law divorce 
system should be responsible for compensating a wife for career damage incurred 
due to a workforce disruption caused by family responsibilities during the marriage. 141 
What Oldham does, then, is to link the notion of career damage with the remedy of 
post-divorce income sharing. He proposes that a system of short-term, transitional 
post-divorce equal income-sharing be created in order to equalise the post-divorce 
living standards of the two resulting households. 142 This sharing would be in addition 
to child support and any property award, and would, according to Oldham, provide 
significant assistance to divorcing mothers when they most need it. 143 
136/bid. 
137See Oldham supra n130 at 143. 
136For instance if a worker is killed or dies he or she may never receive the benefits of his/her education 
or retirement plan. Such contingencies, it is argued, make career assets theoretical but not real. Sinclair 
supra n4 at 142 ft 22. Eekelaar supra n11 at 90 also notes that the sharing of these assets presses the 
ideology of equality too far. It demands equality of result stretching into the long-term future, which may 
be incoherent and objectionable because it assumes that if the claimant spouse had not married, she 
would have had a successful career and marriage prevented her from doing so. In fact, she most 
probably would have married someone else and chosen the same lifestyle. 
139Since many career assets involve future benefits, calculating their value requires actuarial 
projections. 
1400ldham supra n130 at 147. 
141 Ibid at 149. 
142/bid at 154 for more detail. He points out that studies in America have shown that the economic 
problems of young divorced women are transitional and the greatest needs appear to be experienced 
shortly after divorce. See Carbone J "Feminism, Gender and the consequences of Divorce" in 
Freeman M Divorce: Where Next? at 205 for a discussion of the principle justifications for income 
sharing, where various criticisms are also outlined. 
143Martha Fineman is also in favour of proposals for income sharing. See Carbone Ibid. Furthermore, 
Eckelaar and Maclean too favour an equalisation principle being applied on divorce. Supra n 11 at 104-
37, as does O'Sullivan who opines that if there is to be financial suffering, it is essential that it is shared 
equitably. See supra n36 at 189. 
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2.3 REFINEMENT 
MAINTENANCE 
OF THE LAW COMPELLING PRIVATE 
In order to solve the problem of female impoverishment after divorce, it is submitted 
that it is essential for the law to recognise and enforce an on-going maintenance 
obligation. Indeed, the efficient enforcement of maintenance laws is critically 
important for female-headed families after divorce, for such laws are a way of 
ensuring that the wealth reaching the hands of the absent men will ultimately benefit 
the children of the family. 144 Furthermore, maintenance laws play an important role in 
reinforcing men's responsibilities in the domestic sphere. They do this by enforcing 
the financial aspect of the joint responsibility that men have, with women, of 
supporting their children. 145 
Furthermore, in addition to child support, it is submitted that divorced single mothers 
also require permanent spousal support. 146 This is particularly necessary in Southern 
Africa where women remain dependent on men as a result of the operation of various 
discriminatory practices and elements of customary law147 and where there are no 
state-sponsored social security systems operating as an alternative source of 
financial assistance. 
And so, the law must be shaped to ensure that both child and spousal support is 
forthcoming. Statutes, which may have loopholes allowing men to escape, must be 
tightened up and lawyers, law officials and women must be trained in the provisions 
of the law. 148 Debtors must be compelled to pay what is owing and in this regard, 
stringent statutory devices to locate defaulters and force them to pay or face 
imprisonment, have been set up in a number of jurisdictions to ensure compliance. 149 
Indeed, harsh penalties must be enforced if defaulters are to be brought to book. 
144Armstrong A "Maintenance in Southern Africa: The role of the Law" in O'Connell supra n1 ·at 59. 
145Armstrong ibid. 
146Refer infra at 30-32 for more detail. 
147Refer postea at 18-20. 
148See Armstrong supra n144 at 60. 
149Sinclair supra n4 at 149. 
26 
CHAPTER THREE 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THOSE LEGAL SOLUTIONS MOST 
APPROPRIATE FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 THE PROVISION OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
In terms of our Constitution, all indigent members of society have a constitutionally 
guaranteed right to have access to social security. 150 However, while it is clear that a 
state has both a moral and legal duty towards such people to provide for their 
material well being, the nature and extent of the social security against indigence 
which a state provides will always depend on the strength of the particular state 
economy and on the social and economic policies of the government. As a 
developing country still reeling from the effects of the iniquitous Apartheid system, 
South Africa, which economically is seen as a third world country with only first world 
elements, is still a long way removed from becoming a welfare state. 
Accordingly, in searching for legal solutions to the feminisation of poverty in South 
Africa, it becomes necessary at the outset to discount as a real option the setting up 
of elaborate social security structures, for clearly, South Africa is not financially able 
to sustain the high cost that would be involved 
Nonetheless, although South Africa does not have a comprehensive and co-
ordinated system of social security, many laws and welfare services do exist which 
regulate social security. For instance, those that make provision for legal aid to 
indigent people, as well as those which provide for unemployment benefits. Health 
services and public housing are also provided and this entails a heavy financial and 
administrative burden on the state. However, if substance is truly to be given to the 
constitutional right to have access to social security, then a system of social security, 
involving co-operation and co-ordination between many state departments and 
between the public and the private sector on an unprecedented scale will have to be 
developed. As this is unlikely to occur on any large scale in the near future, other 
more viable and feasible solutions to the poverty problem of single-parent families 
need to be found. 
150See secs 27(1) and 27(2). Section 184(3) also empowers the Human Rights Commission to obtain 
information annually from organs of state on measures that have been taken towards the realisation of 
the right to inter alia social security. 
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3.2 THE SHARING OF ASSETS AT DIVORCE 
3.2.1 THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
Sinclair is of the opinion that the section 7(3) judicial discretion to distribute the assets 
of spouses, which is currently applicable to only a small number of marriages, should 
be extended to apply to all marriages. 151 Apart from the fact that the selective 
operation of the discretion152 is probably unconstitutional due to the different treatment 
accorded to people in the same circumstances153 , it is submitted that this extension is 
necessary in order to mitigate the harshness and inequity that flows from any rigid 
application of any matrimonial property system. 154 
In 1990 the Law Commission decided against extending the court's discretion. Their 
decision155 was based on the fact that legal uncertainty would result, that there would 
be an infringement of contractual freedom and further, there was the possibility that 
the distribution of assets could be in conflict with the wishes of a party. 156 Many legal 
and feminist writers are also of the opinion that discretionary standards need to be 
replaced with firm and easily administered rules to overcome judicial bias. 157 
In spite of the above arguments, it is submitted, however, that judicial discretion must 
be retained; Sinclair points out that unlike Australian law where there is no starting 
point of equality in the division of property, thereby making the outcome of divorce 
litigation too uncertain, 158 South African law already has the advantage of structured 
matrimonial property systems to create the required starting point from which the 
discretion could operate. We would thus have the optimum mix of rules and discretion 
as recommended by Oldham.159 In any case, granting our judges an extended 
151Sinclair supra n4 at 145 ft 388. 
152Described postea at 13. 
153The date of the marriage cannot serve to differentiate between people in identical circumstances. As 
Sinclair points out supra n4 at 148, this is discriminatory, the discrimination taking the form of denying 
to those people a remedy to relieve injustice that is granted to persons married with an identical 
system, but earlier. 
154For example, the discretion could be used to prevent the automatic equal division of the estate, or 
where no sharing would otherwise have taken place, to impose some form of sharing. See Sinclair ibid 
at 145. 
155See SALC Report "Review of the Law of Divorce" Project 12 of 1990 at 24. (Hereafter referred to as 
the SALC Divorce Report.) 
156For example, in many second (or later) marriages involving elderly persons who already have 
families in existance, it is often the wish of those parties to keep their estates totally separate for their 
own respective families. SALC Divorce Report ibid. 
157Carbone supra n142 at 206. 
156Sinclair supra n4 ft 388. 
159See discussion postea at 24 ft 30 . 
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discretion to redistribute money and property on divorce would hardly be a 
revolutionary thing to do, for judicial discretion is already extensively used; in custody 
awards, with regard to the guardianship of a child and in determining maintenance 
awards. So, as long as the guidelines and principles upon which the discretionary 
decision must be based are realistic and workable, the apparent ·disadvantage of 
uncertainty may be outweighed by the fact that the preservation by the court of the 
"utmost elasticity to deal with each case on its own facts will be conducive to a more 
equitable resolution of family conflicts."160 
3.2.2 INCLUSION OF THE "NEW PROPERTY" WHEN DIVIDING THE MARITAL 
ESTATE. 
It is submitted that if there is to be any relief for the impoverished single-parent in 
South Africa after divorce, serious account must be taken of the "new property" which 
must be included when dividing the marital estate. Recognising the principle of 
pension-sharing on divorce is one way of doing this, and as South African common 
law does not recognise this, 161 it was up to the legislature, acting on the advice of the 
Law Commission, to effect change. It did so by enacting the Divorce Amendment Act 
7 of 1989 which attempted to divide the interests which one or both parties may have 
in a pension fund. 162 The provisions of the Act have, however, been criticised as being 
both inadequate and confusing. 163 In spite of these criticisms, it may be said that the 
Act itself does contribute positively towards ensuring a fairer distribution of assets on 
divorce which will assist the impoverished single parent, however, its usefulness as a 
real solution to impoverishment is not far reaching. For, to ask the court to make an 
order in respect of pension benefits is seen as a last resort for those parties who 
cannot otherwise make an equitable division. 164 The Law Commission itself165 asks 
the parties to preferably settle their financial affairs first before interfering with 
pensions. The commission also suggests that its intention was for a spouse's right to 
a percentage of the pension interest in settlement negotiations to constitute a lever 
160Sinclair J "Financial Provision on Divorce - Need, Compensation or Entitlement?" 1981 SALJ at 
481. 
161 0n the basis that before a pension becomes payable, a pension interest is merely a spes- not an 
asset in an estate and it therefore cannot form part of the joint estate in a marriage in community of 
property, nor of accrual to a spouses estate, nor can it be the object of an order for the transfer of 
assets in terms of section 7(3). 
162By defining "pension interest" and inserting sections 7(7) and 7(8), the Act identifies the nature of the 
pension interest and indicates how to calculate its value. 
1631t is beyond the scope of this discussion to canvass these criticisms, but see generally: Lane W 
"Pensions and divorce: dealing with pension interests" De Rebus December 1993 at 1090. 
164/bid. 
165/bid. 
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for obtaining some other compensatory benefit. Thus, for example, a contributing 
spouse may cede to the other spouse a policy for the equivalent value, or transfer to 
the other spouse a sum of money or other asset. Often, though, a person's pension 
interest as defined, will be found to be negligible and not worth fighting about. 166 
What South Africa needs to do is to expand the boundaries of the current recognised 
forms of property. The career asset, which is currently not taken into account when 
sharing the accruals or when a redistribution order is made, 167 should be given 
greater recognition. Indeed, a bold, enlightened approach in the recognition of new 
types of property needs to be adopted if we are to maximise the benefits of sharing 
assets on divorce. 
3.3 MAINTENANCE REFORMS 
3.3.1 PERMANENT SPOUSAL SUPPORT 
It has been submitted that the emphasis on the clean-break principle and general aim 
of the law to make women self sufficient after divorce and consequent demise of the 
permanent spousal support award has been a major contributing factor to the 
impoverishment of female-headed families. Accordingly, it is submitted that the key to 
improving their economic position lies in the widespread granting of permanent 
spousal support by our divorce courts in addition to child maintenance and any 
property award that may be made. 
Recently in the United States, 168 recognition has already been given of the fact that 
permanent maintenance should be awarded if for example one spouse has 
contributed to the household or to the upbringing of the children, or where one 
spouse has contributed to the other spouse's career or education, or where a 
spouse's earning capacity is enough to maintain the standard of living of the marriage 
and the disparity between the two spouse's earning power. 169 
Insofar as South Africa is concerned, it is De Jong's submission that after divorce, 
although in principle spouses should bear the responsibility of-supporting themselves, 
166Lane Ibid at 1092. 
167De Jong supra n16 at 82. 
168For example in Pennsylvania, California and Florida - previously "clean-break" states. See De Jong 
ibid. 
169De Jong ibid at 83. 
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there are also definite circumstances that justify the award of a permanent 
maintenance order to be paid by the one spouse to the other. 110 These circumstances 
include where a spouse has contributed more than his or her share to the household 
and the upbringing of the children and has thereby been economically denied the 
same opportunity as the other spouse to reach his or her full potential. 171 
De Jong submits that permanent spousal support should be awarded regardless of 
whether the deprived spouse is currently working or has the ability to do so in the 
future. In those cases, the award would act as a supplement to maintain a decent 
standard of living after divorce. 172 De Jong notes that this approach would have the 
effect of enforcing social equality, for it would encourage mothers to work while at the 
same time, fathers would come to realise that it they did not assume their rightful 
share of the housework and upbringing of the children during the marriage, they 
would be compelled to support their ex-wives after divorce on an ongoing basis. 173 
De Jong rejects the view that the common law requirements for maintenance, namely 
need and the ability to pay, are the only ones to be taken into account when 
considering spousal support. She notes that by including certain factors in section 
7(2) of the Divorce Act such as the standard of living of the spouses prior to the 
divorce and the conduct of each spouse insofar as it may be relevant to the 
breakdown of the marriage, whether a redistribution order in terms of section 7(3) will 
be made and any other factor which. , in the court's opinion, should be taken into 
account, the legislature did not only envisage need as a criterion, but also 
compensation or a spouse's contribution. 174 
Our Constitution, which guarantees real equality demands that this kind of approach 
to maintenance orders be followed. Support for this viewpoint also comes from cases 
such as Grasso v Grasso175, Pommerel v Pommeref 76, Nilsson v Nilsson111 and 
Rousalis v Rousalis. 178 In Nilsson and Rousalis the court noted that post-divorce 
maintenance in terms of section 7 of the Divorce Act is not dependent on the 
common law requirements of need and the ability to pay but also on other factors 
such as one spouse's contribution to the household and the upbringing of children. It 
170/bid at 84 and 85. 
171 Ibid. 
172/bid. 
1731bid. 
174/bid. 
1751987 1SA48 (C). 
1761990 1 SA 998 (E). 
1771984 2 SA 294 (C). 
1781980 3 SA 446 (C). 
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was suggested by the court that section 7 can and should be used to ensure fairness 
between the parties. Furthermore, in Pommeref79, Mullins J rejected Baker J's 
comments in Kroon180 that no maintenance would be awarded to an ex-wife who 
could support herself. Mullins stated that a woman's ability to earn income does not 
per se disentitle her to maintenance since the reasonableness or 'otherwise of her 
decision not to work must be considered. 181 Mullins also commented that 
"I know of no authority which requires a mother to go to work to maintain herself 
where it is reasonable that she should stay at home to care for her children and where 
her former husband is able to maintain her and the children ... without her working."162 
Furthermore, in Grasso183 Berman J expressed doubts whether in South Africa a 
divorced woman who has not worked during the marriage is entitled to no more than 
rehabilitative maintenance. 
Clearly, the above dicta represent a departure from the view of maintenance as 
simply being based on need and provide the authority for De Jong's suggested 
approach which is consistent with the criteria of section 7(2) of the Divorce Act and 
which involves compensating a spouse for her contribution by means of a permanent 
maintenance order. De Jong therefore calls on the courts to consider under "any 
other factor" issues such as the unequal economic circumstances of husband and 
wife and the extent to which this has resulted from the marriage. 184 She notes that: 
"The objective of post-divorce spousal support should be to adjust the economic 
advantages and disadvantages arising from the marriage equitably, in so far as the 
adjustment is not made by means of the parties' matrimonial property system or a 
redistribution order in terms of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act. In this way, outcomes 
will be equalised and a woman will have access to the marital asset which has the 
most potential to redress gendered economic disadvantage, namely her husband's 
future income."185 
179Supra. 
1601986 4 SA 616 E 632. 
181at 1003H. 
182at 10020. 
183Supra. 
164De Jong supra n16 at 84. 
165/bid at 84. 
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3.3.2 EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE PRIVATE 
MAINTENANCE OBLIGATION 
In order for our judicial maintenance system to provide effective assistance to those 
women heading single-parent families it is necessary for it to be effectively 
administered and the maintenance obligation stringently enforced. The legislature, in 
enacting the new 1998 Maintenance Act, set out to achieve this. While the Act deals 
with many of the problems, not all concerns have been addressed and further reform 
is required. 
While the scope of this discussion does not allow for a detailed analysis of the 1998 
Maintenance Act, a few observations include the fact that the Act continues to leave 
the institution of a maintenance inquiry within the discretion of the maintenance 
officer. Clark submits that no discretion should be allowed, and that in all cases the 
officer should be bound to institute an inquiry, for until a body of competent and 
adequately trained maintenance officers exists, the interests of complainants, 
especially children, must be safeguarded at all costs. 166 
The lack of training of maintenance officers in maintenance issues is also not 
specifically addressed by the Act, however, provision is made for the appointment of 
maintenance investigators with various investigative functions and powers. 167 In terms 
of the Act, a Magistrate will also be e~titled to order a maintenance officer to examine 
any person likely to give information relating to the residence or employment of any 
person legally liable to maintain another person or the financial position of such 
person. 166 
It is hoped that the above measures will ensure a more thorough and satisfactory 
maintenance inquiry, which in turn will produce positive results for complainants. 
In terms of the Act, further provision is also made for the imposition of a garnishee 
order at the same time that the principal maintenance order is made. 169 This is to be 
welcomed. The court must however be satisfied that the liable person is in the service 
of an employer. Furthermore, notice of the order must be served within 7 days. 
Another welcome provision, given the difficulty of securing a person's attendance at 
166Clark supra n73 at 65. See Also SALC Maintenance Report supra n68 at paras 4.26 and 4.27. 
187 See section 5. 
166See section 8. 
169See section 16(2). 
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court, is that orders may be granted against a person not present at the inquiry if that 
person gives his consent in writing. 190 
Insofar as the sentencing of offenders is concerned, it is submitted that the court's 
discretion to suspend or postpone sentences should be limited191 and family law 
lawyers must actively intervene to ensure that continual postponement does not 
occur. 192 
Furthermore, in spite of the arguments against imposing prison terms for continuous 
defaulting193, it is submitted that periodic imprisonment is a viable sentencing option 
that magistrates should utilise more frequently. 194 It is further submitted, however, that 
correctional supervision will probably be more appropriate in most cases, for 
offenders can then be subjected to monitoring and control over their financial affairs 
in order to ensure compliance with their maintenance obligation. Such persons may 
also be subjected to educational programmes in order to provide them with the 
necessary skills to improve their financial affairs. 195 
Whatever sentencing option is chosen, the choice must illustrate that our legal 
system is serious about the enforcement of maintenance orders."196 
190See section 17. 
191 Clark supra n73 at 68. But see SALC Maintenance Report supra n68 at 4.39. 
192De Jong supra n16 at 84. 
193Such as the fact that applicant may be further prejudiced due to the fact that respondent is unable to 
earn a living while in prison. 
194De Jong supra n16 at 87; SALC Maintenance Report supra n68 at 4.35; Lotriet The Magistrate 
1996 4 123 at 132. 
195Lotriet ibid at 134. 
196De Jong supra n 16 at 87. 
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CONCLUSION 
While the focus of the discussion has been on legal solutions to the feminisation of 
poverty, one needs to be aware of the limits of the law, as a vehicle of social 
change. 197 Although formal equality has been attained and unfair discrimination 
outlawed by our constitution, this alone does not guarantee women freedom from 
oppression and poverty. 198 
Sinclair points out that: 
"The poverty being experienced by divorced and single mothers heading one-parent 
families will not be overcome as long as current assumptions about the family and 
the responsibility for parenting persist and the present male-oriented structure of paid 
employment remains unchallenged."199 
Accordingly, what single-parent families need is a comprehensive program of legal 
measures combined with financial support, child care assistance, and strategies for 
increasing women's education and employment opportunities within society. The paid 
employment arena needs to be restructured to enable mothers to care for their 
children, while at the same time inculcating into the fathers a sense of acceptance 
that they too are responsible for child care. 200 A blurring of the public and private 
worlds must take place. 
Certainly, a broad and bold, innovative approach needs to be adopted if we are to 
solve the problem of the feminisation of poverty. All potential solutions need to be 
thoroughly considered. As it is not possible for the state to bear the full financial 
burden of supporting indigent one-parent families, then perhaps ideas such as 
Hahlo's suggestion of a compulsory third-party insurance being established, which in 
the case of a break-up of a marriage would take care of the needs of the children, 
should be borne in mind201 • At this stage in South African history, where the 
disastrous effects of Apartheid continue to be felt, the public must expect to be called 
197 Albertyn and Kentridge "Introducing the Right to Equality in the Interim Constitution" (1994) 1 SAJHR 
149 at 152. Sugarman S "Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce" in Sugarman and Kay Divorce Reform 
at the Crossroads also recognises the inadequacy of divorce laws on their own to eradicate the poverty 
experienced by women heading single-parent families. See Sinclair supra n4 at 153. 
198Note here Giminez' marxist feminist perspective which is that people are poor, not because of their 
age, sex or race, but rather because of their social class. She predicts that the deterioration in the 
standard of living of workers will continue, along with retrenchments and cuts in social spending. See 
Giminez,M "The Feminisation of Poverty: Myth or Reality?" 1990 17 Social Justice 43 at 58. Discussed 
in Sinclair supra n4 at 25. 
199Sinclair supra n4 at 29. 
200Sinclair supra n4 at 152. 
201 Hahlo supra n7 at 16. 
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upon to assist in the upliftment of those indigent members of society, specifically 
single-parent families headed by women. 
Burman202 suggests a number of developmental options for helping single mothers 
that would not necessarily bankrupt the state or be too insignificant to address a 
family's most basic needs. One suggestion is for a portion of individual grants to be 
put into community services that a group of single mothers could use - child-care 
centres and school feeding schemes, for example. These could also provide jobs for 
women. A further suggestion is to tax all fathers who do not live with their children, 
and to pay a child allowance to all single mothers. Perhaps Burman's most 
controversial suggestion is to introduce a voluntary system in terms of which most of 
the money paid for /obo/o would be invested in unit trusts or life assurance instead of 
going to the bride's family. This money could then act as a safety net for children of 
the marriage in the event of the marriage failing. 
It has also been suggested that support obligations should be imposed on social 
parents rather than only on biological ones. 203 This is done in Zimbabwe and Sweden 
where support obligations are imposed on step parents when the natural parents are 
unable to support the child. 204 
With regard to the divorce process itself, it is submitted that wider use should be 
made of the informal process of conciliation as a way of reaching a satisfactory post-
divorce settlement, rather than having to bear the cost - both financial and emotional-
of an adversarial proceeding. Indeed, divorce mediation is seen to reduce the conflict 
between divorcing parties, its purpose being not only to help spouses reach an 
agreement which recognises the needs and rights of all family members, but also to 
lay the foundation for the healthy structuring of post-divorce family life, a foundation 
essential for the effective functioning of the single-parent family. 205 
Our courts must also apply the "clean break" principle cautiously, given the unequal 
starting point of women after divorce. Indeed, it is submitted that wide recognition of 
202Tribute Newspaper supra n5. 
203See Clark supra n55 at 278. 
204Clark ibid. 
205See generally Macnab D and Mowatt J "Mediation and Arbitration as alternative procedures in 
maintenance and custody disputes in the event of divorce" 1986 De Jure 313. It is unfortunate that the 
family courts, established by the Magistrates Courts Amendment Act 120 of 1993, while having the 
jurisdiction to adjudicate divorce actions (thereby introducing "local, cheaper and quite probably quicker 
justice" Editorial: 'divorces in the lower courts: taking justice to the people' 1993 De Rebus at 73). do 
not introduce and use mediation as a means of resolving disputes. but simply provide us with an 
alternative forum for formal divorce adjudication to take place. 
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permanent post divorce spousal support would go a long way towards alleviating the 
plight of many an impoverished single-parent family. Indeed, after divorce, women 
are entitled to be awarded an equal share of the results of the marital partnership by 
fully sharing her husband's career assets, including his enhanced earning capacity, 
through both property and support awards. Of course, the women heading these 
families would also be expected to work and contribute financially to their families 
needs where they are capable of doing so and where necessary, for as Sinclair 
notes: 
"Women ... must come to realise that housewife marriage has become a luxury which 
few can afford and which the law cannot encourage."206 
Having said that, it is essential to recognise that our divorce law must compensate for 
the greater burdens that the current system imposes on women and children of 
single-parent families. All legal reforms need to be based on fairness, equity and 
equality of results.207 
Aggressive laws and policies must also be adopted to force the non-paying non-
custodial parent to comply with his maintenance obligations, for men who have 
fathered children cannot be allowed to continue to avoid their financial 
responsibilities. However, considering the high unemployment rate and the extent of 
poverty and deprivation in South Africa, it is submitted that significant state 
intervention and assistance is essential. The state must, somehow, find the 
resources to contribute financially towards ensuring the upliftment of these families'206 
or at least make sure that effective enforcement measures are in place. "Together, 
private maintenance and state assistance are better than either on its own."209 
Accordingly, if the phenomenon known as the feminisation of poverty is to be 
successfully addressed, it is submitted that a composite, all-inclusive approach 
needs to be adopted that incorporates a number of solutions that together will result 
in the upliftment of women heading single-parent families. 
206Sinclair supra n4 at 152. 
207Weitzman supra n5 at 108. 
2061n this regard it was heartening to note the Minister of Finance, Trevor Manual's recent statement 
that the government is to increase its spending on job creation, infrastructural development and poverty 
relief by R500 million to R1 ,5 billion by 2001-02. The Independent on Saturday 7 Aug 1999. 
209Weitzman supra n5 at 153. 
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23 1963 Maintenance Act 13 
99 1998 Maintenance Act 13, 16 
s 5, 8, 16(2) 33 
s 17 34 
120 1993 Magistrates Courts Amendment Act 36 
88 1984 Matrimonial Property Act 11 
41 
30 
120 
106 
s 2-17 
1950 Population Registration Act 
1998 Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act 
s 4, 7(2), 8 
1997 Welfare Laws Amendment Act 
s4 
2. UNITED STA TES OF AMERICA 
1970 Uniform Marriage 
and Divorce Act 
3. UNITED KINGDOM 
1984 Matrimonial and Family 
Proceedings Act 
1970 Matrimonial Proceedings 
and Property Act 
4. GERMANY 
1977 Marriage Law Reform Act 
5. NEW ZEALAND 
1973 Social Security Act 
12 
18 
20 
17 
9 
9 
23 
10 
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